The Co-operative Communication of Human Beings. Origins of Human Communication.

Description : Lecture 2. The Co-operative Communication of Human Beings
Human co-operative gestures emanate from skills and motivations of shared intentionality.

Human beings are inordinately co-operative: evolutionary anamoly Communication: "whites of the eyes" analogy; share info

2.1. Machievellian vs. Vygotskian Intelligence
Ape cognition adapted for competition Early studies of ape ToM in co-op. paradigm => failure Studies of Hare et al. (2000, 2001) in comp. paradigm => success Hare & Tomas competitive Obj Choice (Lecture 1) Apes und. perception, goals, acts (+knowledge, not false beliefs) Human cognition, in addition, adapted for co-operation & cultural life Shared Intentionality: (i) Skills = shared ('we') goals/intentions, attention/knowledge; (ii) Motivations = helping, sharing Co-operation: apes in Melis et al '06 collaborate; in W&T '06 help but no shared goal in Warneken & T in press (videos) but no comm. during collaborative actions Social Learning : apes have some skills of social learning but human imitation, instructed, & normative learning (video) Communication : e.g., pointing gesture hypothesis: co-op comm. key also to collab. & soc. learn.

2.2. Human Pointing Fundamentals
By itself, pointing is nothing! Table 1a examples: if you look over there, you'll know what I want (mindreading) Characterizing gestures: Table 1b examples The JA frame: common ground (diff levels a la Clark) no frame = no meaning (although 'crying child' example) different frames = different meanings (ex: bucket as location or as plastic) perspectival , in a sense must be shared (ex: plastic as fetish) => common ground can involve absent referents ('missing belt' example) Communicative act: 3 levels of intentions (+ indiv. goals) Social intention (motive, speech act goal): requestive: that you do X [to help me] informative: that you know X [to help you] expressive: that you feel X [so we can share, id w/ one another] also: greeting; gratitude; guilt; & other ¿expressives? referent = my feeling [but no pointing!] Communicative intention : that we know together that I am attempting to communicate - so that you will attend to the referential act and thereby infer my social intention [mutually manifest, public => hidden authorship] co-operative effort that you understand (Clark) Referential intention: that you attend to my referent and to my expression of motive [either may be omitted in familiar context, e.g., dentist] pointing directs other to referent spatially expression of motive by face, voice, body Individual Goals : many layers to pursuade, to insult, to deceive; but also to get/eat apple.

2.3. Model Based on Primitives
Primitives of co-op communication: Basic primate perceptual & cognitive skills => world logic of intentional/rational action (+ causality) => reasons Persons: I, You, We Psychological States: (i) do, (ii) want/goal/intend, (iii) see/attend/know, (iv) feel Basic Schema = I want: we know: I want: you do/feel/know X Assumption of Helpfulness: help = I want: [you see:] world = your goal generates both relevance inferences and obligations Most general communicative motives = helping and sharing Request Action/Info (Get Help): I want: you help me Offer Action/Info (Help): I want: I help you Express/Share: I want: we do/feel/know X Specialty Motives: greeting, thanking, apologizing Return to apes in object choice Hare & T competitive object choice => apes und. goal of reaching Also: Herrmann & T "Don't!" experiment => und. behavioral prohibitions No: (1) joint attentional frame (JAF) for reference (2) und. of ['we'] communicative intention for relevance (3) und. of motive to help by informing So, not missing und. of intentionality, but shared intentionality Human evol.: declarative and informative pointing when shared intentionality (and imperatives become co-operative).

2.4. An Evolutionary Fairy Tale
Stage 1: Homo: Imitation of tool making: conformity norms also: analysis of rational action: decision-making (Gergely et al., 2002) quantitative, not qualitative, difference to apes Stage 2: Homosapiens: Shared Intentionality Mutualism - indirect reciprocity [reputation] - strong reciprocity [norms] Selection for collaborative activities [many mutualistic] Social-cognitive skills: shared goals, intentions, attention Social-cognitive motivations helping => indirect reciprocity [reputation > gossip] => strong reciprocity [ social norms for helping] sharing: identify w/ others of group, bonding/intimacy, gossip Co-operative Communication Making public desires and knowledge in co-op. communication relevance based on assumption of helpfulness Imperative: C advertises request for help A responds b/c enhances reputation for helpfulness C thanks b/c enhances reputation as advertising partner Informative: C advertises own helpfulness (w/r/t providing info.) A accepts help (& thanks in some cases) Expressive/Sharing: C & A bond, identification [gratitude, greeting, etc.] Social norms on helpfulness = public obligations A cannot ignore invitation to communication [or insane] C&A cannot not help when low cost [or anti-social] Attention-getter to co-op. pointing => JAF (triadic) + comm. intention (we) New motives to help and share => offering, informing, sharing Indiv. imperative to co-op imperative: C & A mutually helpful Int. movment to co-op. char. gesture: => JAF (triadic) + comm. intention (we) imitation => convention.

2.5. Summary: Human Co-operative Communication
Humans communicate by publically expressing their thoughts, feelings, desires Assumes a generally helpful social world [norms] Assumes social world concrnd w/ reputation & group cohsion => gossip Shared intentionality infrastructure: (i) Skills = shared ('we') goals/intentions, attention/knowledge; (ii) Motivations = helping, sharing Pointing most basic form of co-op comm. [char. gestures for actions & absent refs] Possible foundational role of co-op. comm. in other forms of Shared Int.: collaboration & cultural learning (esp. instructed and normative learning).

Some References
Hare, B., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2001). Do chimpanzees know what conspecifics know? Animal Behavior, 61, 139 - 151 Hare, B., Call, J., Agnetta, B., & Tomasello, M. (2000). Chimpanzees know what conspecifics do and do not see. Animal Behaviour, 59, 771-785.. Hare, B., & Tomasello, M. (2005). Human-like social skills in dogs? Trends in Cognitive Science, 9, 439-444. Melis, A., Hare, B., & Tomasello, M. (2006). Chimpanzees recruit the best collaborators. Science, 31 ,1297 - 1300. Tomasello, M. (1999). The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition. Harvard University Press Tomasello, M., Call, J., & Hare, B. (2003). Chimpanzees understand psychological states: The question is which ones and to what extent. Trends in Cognitive Science, 7, 153-156 Tomasello, M., Carpenter, M., & Liszkowski, U. (submitted). A new look at infant pointing. Tomasello, M., Carpenter, M., Call, J., Behne, T., & Moll, H. (2005). Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28, 675 - 691. Tomasello, M., Kruger, A., & Ratner, H. (1993). Cultural learning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 16, 495-552. Warneken, F., Chen. F., & Tomasello, M. (in press). Cooperative activities in young children and chimpanzees. Child Development. Wyman, E. & Tomasello, M. (in press). The ontogenetic origins of human cooperation. In L. Barrett & R. Dunbar, Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology. Warneken, F. & Tomasello, M. (2006). Altruistic helping in human infants and young chimpanzees. Science, 31 ,1301 - 1303.