Description : Lecture 2. The Co-operative Communication of Human Beings
Human co-operative gestures emanate from skills and motivations of shared intentionality.
Human beings are inordinately co-operative: evolutionary anamoly
Communication: "whites of the eyes" analogy; share info
2.1. Machievellian vs. Vygotskian Intelligence
Ape cognition adapted for competition
Early studies of ape ToM in co-op. paradigm => failure
Studies of Hare et al. (2000, 2001) in comp. paradigm => success
Hare & Tomas competitive Obj Choice (Lecture 1)
Apes und. perception, goals, acts (+knowledge, not false beliefs)
Human cognition, in addition, adapted for co-operation & cultural life
Shared Intentionality: (i) Skills = shared ('we') goals/intentions, attention/knowledge; (ii) Motivations = helping, sharing
Co-operation: apes in Melis et al '06 collaborate; in W&T '06 help
but no shared goal in Warneken & T in press (videos)
but no comm. during collaborative actions
Social Learning : apes have some skills of social learning
but human imitation, instructed, & normative learning (video)
Communication : e.g., pointing gesture
hypothesis: co-op comm. key also to collab. & soc. learn.
2.2. Human Pointing Fundamentals
By itself, pointing is nothing!
Table 1a examples: if you look over there, you'll know what I want (mindreading)
Characterizing gestures: Table 1b examples
The JA frame: common ground (diff levels a la Clark)
no frame = no meaning (although 'crying child' example)
different frames = different meanings (ex: bucket as location or as plastic)
perspectival , in a sense
must be shared (ex: plastic as fetish) => common ground
can involve absent referents ('missing belt' example)
Communicative act: 3 levels of intentions (+ indiv. goals)
Social intention (motive, speech act goal):
requestive: that you do X [to help me]
informative: that you know X [to help you]
expressive: that you feel X [so we can share, id w/ one another]
also: greeting; gratitude; guilt; & other ¿expressives?
referent = my feeling [but no pointing!]
Communicative intention : that we know together that I am attempting to communicate - so that you will attend to the referential act and thereby infer my social intention [mutually manifest, public => hidden authorship]
co-operative effort that you understand (Clark)
Referential intention: that you attend to my referent and to my expression of motive [either may be omitted in familiar context, e.g., dentist]
pointing directs other to referent spatially
expression of motive by face, voice, body
Individual Goals : many layers
to pursuade, to insult, to deceive; but also to get/eat apple.
2.3. Model Based on Primitives
Primitives of co-op communication:
Basic primate perceptual & cognitive skills => world
logic of intentional/rational action (+ causality) => reasons
Persons: I, You, We
Psychological States: (i) do, (ii) want/goal/intend, (iii) see/attend/know, (iv) feel
Basic Schema = I want: we know: I want: you do/feel/know X
Assumption of Helpfulness: help = I want: [you see:] world = your goal
generates both relevance inferences and obligations
Most general communicative motives = helping and sharing
Request Action/Info (Get Help): I want: you help me
Offer Action/Info (Help): I want: I help you
Express/Share: I want: we do/feel/know X
Specialty Motives: greeting, thanking, apologizing
Return to apes in object choice
Hare & T competitive object choice => apes und. goal of reaching
Also: Herrmann & T "Don't!" experiment => und. behavioral prohibitions
No: (1) joint attentional frame (JAF) for reference
(2) und. of ['we'] communicative intention for relevance
(3) und. of motive to help by informing
So, not missing und. of intentionality, but shared intentionality
Human evol.: declarative and informative pointing when shared intentionality (and imperatives become co-operative).
2.4. An Evolutionary Fairy Tale
Stage 1: Homo: Imitation of tool making: conformity norms
also: analysis of rational action: decision-making (Gergely et al., 2002)
quantitative, not qualitative, difference to apes
Stage 2: Homosapiens: Shared Intentionality
Mutualism - indirect reciprocity [reputation] - strong reciprocity [norms]
Selection for collaborative activities [many mutualistic]
Social-cognitive skills: shared goals, intentions, attention
Social-cognitive motivations
helping => indirect reciprocity [reputation > gossip] =>
strong reciprocity [ social norms for helping]
sharing: identify w/ others of group, bonding/intimacy, gossip
Co-operative Communication
Making public desires and knowledge in co-op. communication
relevance based on assumption of helpfulness
Imperative: C advertises request for help
A responds b/c enhances reputation for helpfulness
C thanks b/c enhances reputation as advertising partner
Informative: C advertises own helpfulness (w/r/t providing info.)
A accepts help (& thanks in some cases)
Expressive/Sharing: C & A bond, identification [gratitude, greeting, etc.]
Social norms on helpfulness = public obligations
A cannot ignore invitation to communication [or insane]
C&A cannot not help when low cost [or anti-social]
Attention-getter to co-op. pointing => JAF (triadic) + comm. intention (we)
New motives to help and share => offering, informing, sharing
Indiv. imperative to co-op imperative: C & A mutually helpful
Int. movment to co-op. char. gesture: => JAF (triadic) + comm. intention (we)
imitation => convention.
2.5. Summary: Human Co-operative Communication
Humans communicate by publically expressing their thoughts, feelings, desires
Assumes a generally helpful social world [norms]
Assumes social world concrnd w/ reputation & group cohsion => gossip
Shared intentionality infrastructure: (i) Skills = shared ('we') goals/intentions, attention/knowledge; (ii) Motivations = helping, sharing
Pointing most basic form of co-op comm. [char. gestures for actions & absent refs]
Possible foundational role of co-op. comm. in other forms of Shared Int.: collaboration & cultural learning (esp. instructed and normative learning).
Some References
Hare, B., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2001). Do chimpanzees know what conspecifics know? Animal Behavior, 61, 139 - 151
Hare, B., Call, J., Agnetta, B., & Tomasello, M. (2000). Chimpanzees know what conspecifics do and do not see. Animal Behaviour, 59, 771-785..
Hare, B., & Tomasello, M. (2005). Human-like social skills in dogs? Trends in Cognitive Science, 9, 439-444.
Melis, A., Hare, B., & Tomasello, M. (2006). Chimpanzees recruit the best collaborators. Science, 31 ,1297 - 1300.
Tomasello, M. (1999). The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition. Harvard University Press
Tomasello, M., Call, J., & Hare, B. (2003). Chimpanzees understand psychological states: The question is which ones and to what extent. Trends in Cognitive Science, 7, 153-156
Tomasello, M., Carpenter, M., & Liszkowski, U. (submitted). A new look at infant pointing.
Tomasello, M., Carpenter, M., Call, J., Behne, T., & Moll, H. (2005). Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28, 675 - 691.
Tomasello, M., Kruger, A., & Ratner, H. (1993). Cultural learning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 16, 495-552.
Warneken, F., Chen. F., & Tomasello, M. (in press). Cooperative activities in young children and chimpanzees. Child Development.
Wyman, E. & Tomasello, M. (in press). The ontogenetic origins of human cooperation. In L. Barrett & R. Dunbar, Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology.
Warneken, F. & Tomasello, M. (2006). Altruistic helping in human infants and young chimpanzees. Science, 31 ,1301 - 1303.